Background
The War on Terror
Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, the risk of great power conflict diminished significantly. However, new dangers came to the fore as terrorist activity posed an increasing threat against U.S. citizens both at home and abroad. One terrorist group, al-Qaeda, would become the primary focus of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
Al-Qaeda was established in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri with the aim of supporting Islamist causes around the world and countering what it saw as profane Western influence in Muslim countries. Over the following years, the United States became the group’s primary target. Al-Qaeda conducted several attacks against the United States and its allies in the late 1990s. The group’s deadliest attack came on September 11, 2001, when militants hijacked four planes and crashed them into targets in the United States. The attacks killed 2,977 people and caused extraordinary destruction at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
The 9/11 attacks brought terrorism definitively to the center of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Abroad, the United States embarked on an expansive campaign to eliminate al-Qaeda and ultimately combat the very notion of terrorism. One week after the attacks, Congress passed an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that formed the basis for a U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, where the ruling Taliban regime had harbored al-Qaeda.
However, many al-Qaeda leaders and militants—including bin Laden himself—were able to flee Afghanistan, with many escaping to the border regions of neighboring Pakistan. This led President George W. Bush to authorize targeted killings of al-Qaeda leaders outside the designated combat zone in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s government quietly allowed the United States to carry out targeted strikes within its borders. However, it refused to publicly acknowledge that such strikes were occurring at all. Yet as it became more obvious that the United States was conducting regular drone strikes, the Pakistani public grew to strongly oppose the program. he issue of drone strikes became an enduring wedge in U.S.-Pakistan relations.
The Bush administration claimed that these counterterrorism operations were needed because of Pakistan’s unwillingness to counter the threat al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups posed. That unwillingness was partly due to Pakistan’s lack of capacity and the fact that it remained primarily focused on its tensions with neighboring India. Yet Pakistan’s reluctance could also have been partly caused by links between terrorist groups and elements of the Pakistani government.
Between 2004 and 2009, the CIA carried out fifty-one reported drone strikes in the country. Initially, the Bush administration used drones sparingly. The administration carried out targeted strikes against known individuals while informing Pakistani military and intelligence officials of each strike. In 2008, however, the Bush administration escalated its drone use in Pakistan, ceasing the practice of notifying Pakistani officials of strikes.
The Obama administration significantly escalated the global war on terror. Correspondingly, non-battlefield operations in Pakistan greatly increased, reaching a peak in 2010 when the United States conducted 122 drone strikes. Obama also expanded non-battlefield counterterrorism operations beyond Pakistan. Still, the United States’ primary counterterrorism focus remained on eliminating Al-Qaeda and finding its leader, who remained at large.
The Tools of Counterterrorism
The United States employed numerous tools in its fight against terrorist organizations. Drone strikes quickly became one of the most frequently used options. This is because Drones offer several advantages over other types of operations. First, drones can fly directly over hostile territory without putting military personnel at risk. Moreover, a fully armed drone can stay in flight over potential targets for over fourteen hours, far longer than any piloted aircraft. As a result, drone strikes can be timed for an ideal moment that minimizes collateral damage. Finally, drones can fire smaller, more precise missiles.
However, drones have several limitations as well. First, drones require a robust intelligence network that can provide accurate targeting information. Faulty intelligence can lead to a failed strike or cause unintended casualties. Moreover, drones fly lower and slower than other aircraft, making them vulnerable to attack. Successful drone operations therefore can often only be effective in countries that lack robust air defense systems or where the United States can depend on the country’s support, or at least consent.
Drone strikes have also proven a controversial tool of counterterrorism. Despite claims of their precision, drone strikes still cause unintended civilian casualties. By some estimates, between 2004 and 2011, U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan caused up to 638 civilian casualties. U.S. drone practices raise legal and ethical questions as well. The U.S. government argues that it can lawfully conduct targeted killings of members of terrorist organizations, even outside battlefield zones. However, many countries have condemned drone strikes as a violation of their sovereignty. Human rights groups have also claimed drone strikes violate international human rights law. This has made their use costly both to the United States’ relationships with its partners and to the U.S. image worldwide.
Drones were not the only instrument of U.S. counterterrorism operations. The United States also employed special operations forces to capture or kill targets. Special forces operations can be effective in areas a drone strike cannot reach. They can also ensure the identification of the targets and retrieve intelligence. However, these operations risk being more costly than drone strikes. In addition to putting U.S. personnel in harm’s way they are higher-profile operations that can cause increased diplomatic tension. Washington has also sought to counter security threats by cooperating with its partners. The United States does this by providing financial and logistical support to countries conducting counterterrorism operations of their own. The United States has provided training assistance, intelligence support, and financial aid to bolster counterterrorism efforts in numerous countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Somalia. However, in many cases U.S. assistance and cooperation have not sufficiently improved the recipient’s capacity to combat terrorist groups within its borders.