Role of the United States
The U.S. involvement in this case stems from not only September 11 but also a long history of al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. service members, civilians, and interests. Especially since 9/11, U.S. military forces, diplomats, and intelligence personnel have operated both unilaterally and in conjunction with local security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. A primary tactic has been killing certain al-Qaeda leaders and a vastly greater number of anonymous militants through drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations.
The principal options available in this case are as follows:
Policy Options
Conducting drone strikes on the compound believed to be inhabited by bin Laden
A drone strike offers a relatively low-risk option that could provide a strong chance of eliminating bin Laden if he is present at the compound. It would not put U.S. personnel in harm’s way. Drones can also be incredibly precise, capable of killing targeted individuals while leaving those nearby unharmed. Despite this precision, drones do still pose the risk of killing or injuring any civilians in the immediate area of the strike. The precision of strikes only matters if the intelligence is timely and accurate. Additionally, after a drone strike, it could be impossible to confirm the identity of the target. Given the range of confidence levels in the available intelligence and the extremely high priority of bin Laden as a target, this option could therefore leave an intolerable amount of uncertainty over whether the strike indeed killed bin Laden. Finally, given the public opposition to drones in Pakistan, this option would risk further damaging already delicate relations with Pakistan.
Ordering a U.S. special forces raid on the compound
A special forces raid offers certain advantages over drone strikes. Primarily, U.S. forces can confirm the identity of those in the compound to ensure that bin Laden was present. Moreover, special forces teams could capture individuals to interrogate and collect information and equipment that could provide intelligence about al-Qaeda. Additionally, personnel can take greater care to protect civilians. However, a raid would expose the individuals involved—and the United States’ reputation—to extreme risks. U.S. forces could be killed in a battle at the compound or by the Pakistani military should it become aware of the mission and try to disrupt it. Al-Qaeda could also capture members of the raiding party, giving the terrorist organization hostages of incalculable value and immediately presenting the United States with the agonizing choice of how to respond. All of this raises the risk of deeper U.S. involvement. Additionally, Pakistan would likely perceive a high-profile American raid—especially one so close to its capital—as an intolerable violation of its sovereignty. The operation could lead to a rupture that would end what little cooperation remained between the two countries. If the United States gave Pakistan prior warning of the mission to avoid such a rupture, elements of Pakistan’s government could pass on the information to al-Qaeda leaders allowing bin Laden and others to flee.
Asking the Pakistani government to capture or kill bin Laden
This option would spare American lives and eliminate the chance of an irreparable diplomatic breach. However, it also offers a far more uncertain chance of success. The Pakistani government could refuse to pursue bin Laden or it could agree but tip off bin Laden or execute the mission incompetently. Despite occasional successes, the United States has had a long history of frustration with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This frustration has contributed to bilateral tensions and the belief among many American policymakers that the United States needs to pursue major terrorist targets itself. Especially for such a high-value target, the risks of entrusting this operation to another country would be significant.
Doing nothing
Given the drawbacks of the other available options and the lack of complete certainty from the intelligence community, the president could choose to delay action and continue to monitor the compound. Such a step has the downside of diminishing the utility of timely intelligence and allowing bin Laden to continue operating unhindered, possibly leading to further attacks on the United States or its allies. Moreover, similar issues to those considered here are likely to arise the next time intelligence on his location emerges. Given the particular circumstances of this case—including the possible presence of civilians at the targeted site—the president could decide to pass on this opportunity. There is a chance that the target’s whereabouts and U.S.-Pakistan relations will be more favorable in the future. At times in the past, the United States has carefully considered the consequences of a counterterrorism operation for its relationship with Pakistan. In 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aborted a large-scale raid on senior al-Qaeda members located in Pakistan’s tribal areas because it had the potential to jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations and place many American lives at risk.