The Issue
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, combating terrorist organizations became a core concern of U.S. foreign policy. This led the United States to conduct operations against terrorist and militant groups around the world. Although the United States targeted various groups, its primary target was al-Qaeda—the group responsible for the September 11 attacks—and its leader, Osama bin Laden.
The United States’ efforts to combat terrorism led it to wage fully-fledged wars against terrorist groups and those who harbor them. The war in Afghanistan was the primary example. However, terrorist groups do not obey national boundaries. Therefore, the war on terror also led the United States to conduct operations in countries with which it was not formally at war. These included Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
The United States used various tools in its pursuit of terrorist and militant groups beyond the battlefield. In many cases, the United States has cooperated with various countries by providing training and intelligence to their security forces. The goal is to help them conduct their own operations against terrorist groups. In some scenarios, the United States has decided that it needs to take action itself. Washington has authorized special forces operations to capture or kill members of terrorist organizations. The United States also increasingly began to conduct precision air strikes from drones. Such attacks could target members of terrorist organizations without putting U.S. personnel at risk.
U.S. counterterrorism operations proved controversial both at home and abroad. Critics highlighted that U.S. operations, especially drone strikes, carried the risk of causing collateral, including killing civilians alongside their targets. Counterterrorism operations, especially in non-battlefield countries, also risked tarnishing the U.S. reputation overseas and straining U.S. relationships with other countries. U.S. counterterrorism operations have been condemned by foreign governments as a violation of their sovereignty. These operations have also sparked public protests both at home and abroad, and drawn sharp criticism from human rights organizations over their legality and ethics.
Decision Point—Set in Spring 2011
After a decade-long search, the CIA has come upon credible evidence of the location of Osama bin Laden. A man whom they believe to be the al-Qaeda leader is living inside a large compound in Abbottabad, a populous city near Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad. The compound also houses roughly twenty women and children, believed to be bin Laden’s relatives. However, based on surveillance of the compound, no one can say with absolute certainty that the individual they have identified is indeed bin Laden. Most of the CIA analysts involved have put their confidence level at 80 percent; some report 95 percent confidence, others rate their confidence as low as 40 percent.
The president has convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to receive advice on how to proceed. If the president decides to authorize action, three main options exist. The first is to conduct a drone strike against the compound, likely killing those in it. This option would risk civilian casualties and potential damage to an already tumultuous relationship with Pakistan. The second option is a raid by special operations forces. A raid could be effective in that troops could correctly identify individual targets and take caution to protect civilians. Troops could also collect computers and documents for intelligence. However, this option poses greater risk to the lives of U.S. service members and could also damage the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Third, the president could ask the Pakistani military to capture or kill bin Laden. This would respect diplomatic ties but has a lower chance of success. Given the lack of complete certainty, the president could also decide to wait for additional confirmation or a better opportunity to strike. However, waiting risks losing the chance to act entirely if the occupants of the compound move and the CIA loses track of them. The president needs to decide quickly whether to authorize action to kill or capture the man believed to be bin Laden and, if so, what action to take.