War Made New

War Made New is the story of how innovations in weaponry and tactics have not only transformed how wars are fought and won but also have guided the course of human events over the past 500 years, from the formation of the first modern states to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the coming of al-Qaeda. The book explores each revolution through narrative accounts of key battles—from the French invasion of Italy in 1494 to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003—with a focus on the role that technology played in determining their outcomes. A final section explores future technologies and applies the lessons of the past to the current discussion of military transformation and the wider war on terror. War Made New is appropriate for:

• Survey courses on military history, modern history, or international relations;
• Specialized history courses focusing on a time period covered by one of the revolutions discussed: Gunpowder (1500–1700), Industrial (1750–1900), Second Industrial (1900–1940), or Information (1970–2005);
• Advanced courses in military history, grand strategy, the history of science and technology, diplomatic history, or international relations.

Students in a history survey course or introductory military history course will learn how key battles brought the technological innovations of their era—gunpowder, industrial production, mechanization, and information technology—to bear on the battlefield. Students will also learn about the historical context of each revolution from the author's introduction and summation of each revolution.

Advanced classes will enjoy a richer reading of each historical period and will benefit from a wide selection of battles that include those that are not as well known but are historically important. War Made New also offers an original perspective on recent operations inAfghanistan andIraq, a discussion of emerging technologies and their potential to revolutionize warfare, and a thoughtful conclusion on the importance and limitations of technology in the ongoing war on terror.

General Courses

Discussion Questions

1. Describe two organizational changes made by armies in the Gunpowder Age to take advantage of this new technology. How did these changes in organization and tactics increase the effectiveness of firepower?
2. In what ways did Industrial Age innovations that improved logistics and communication contribute to victory on the battlefield? Explain your answer with two examples.
3. Describe what made the Germans so successful in their blitzkrieg campaign against the French despite both sides having access to comparable technology.
4. Explain how information technology has been used to enhance the effectiveness of certain "legacy" military systems. Give two examples.
5. Explain the importance of language skills and cultural knowledge for coalition troops in the Iraq War. What have been the limitations of technology in enhancing these capabilities?
6. Give two examples of how emerging technologies might be used to wage war with fewer casualties.

Advanced Courses

Discussion Questions

1. How did the entrenched powers of the Gunpowder Age (Spain, theHoly Roman Empire, the Maratha Confederacy) adapt to the introduction of firearms and cannons? Over the long run, did this innovation strengthen or weaken these empires?
2. What was the impact of Industrial Age warfare on the role of governments in financing military expenditures and providing welfare benefits for its citizens?
3. Compare the military successes and failures of the Mahdist fighters in the Battle of Omdurman with those of the insurgents in the Iraq War.
4. Despite the lethality of Industrial Age weapons, the author notes that battlefield fatalities as a percentage of total military strength were actually lower in World War II than in previous eras, largely because battlefield commanders more effectively dispersed their troops in an effort to avoid mass casualties. How has this same tactic been used by insurgents inIraqto nullify the technological advantage of coalition troops?
5. The author cites a U.S. Air Force researcher: "The smarter the weapon, the dumber HPM [high-powered microwaves] can make it." How might this specific example be used to describe a general vulnerability of high-tech military systems?
6. The author states that "To the limited extent that we can generalize about 500 years of history, it seems fair to say that the most radical innovations come from outside of formal military structures." Is it more difficult for militaries to innovate than it is for private-sector firms? If so, why?