Role of the United States
Because NATO is both a central institution of U.S. foreign policy and a major strategic asset, the United States sees any Russian military activity near the Baltic states as a challenge it needs to—in some fashion—meet. The United States has a strong interest in maintaining the security of its European allies and in sending a firm signal to Russia that it cannot threaten them without consequence. Yet no decision on supporting an ally in trouble is a simple one, especially when the opposing power is a nuclear-armed state with considerable military and economic might. Any escalation in the conflict could have high costs for both U.S. and NATO military personnel.
As a first step, the United States, along with its NATO allies, had to consider how severe the threat from Russia’s actions was. Russian buildup near the Baltics had yet to constitute an armed attack that would justify invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing activity in Ukraine, the Baltic states sought strong signals of U.S. resolve.
Second, the United States will need to carefully consider how to most effectively assist without unnecessarily escalating the conflict. If, on the other hand, NATO members hold off invoking Article 5, Western policymakers could have more flexibility. In either case, Baltic leaders and other NATO allies will seek strong signals of U.S. resolve, and any U.S. action seen as half-hearted under these circumstances could cause allies in Europe and beyond to question U.S. commitment to collective security.
Apart from the question of whether Article 5 applies, the United States has a variety of policy tools available in supporting the Baltic states. NSC members will need to examine the costs and benefits of those tools as well as ways to combine them. They could also advise taking none of the steps if they conclude U.S. interests are best served by staying out of the crisis.
Policy Options
Military measures
If the United States believes the Baltic states’ status as treaty allies calls for a strong show of support, it has a range of military options, such as immediately deploying U.S. rapid-reaction troops, mobilizing a larger multinational NATO contingent, and positioning naval forces off the coasts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. If NSC members choose to pursue military action, they will need to consider how U.S. and NATO forces can most effectively respond while avoiding unnecessary escalation. NATO forces could be deployed to reinforce the Baltic states’ defenses unobtrusively, so as to not inflame Russia, or take a more visible approach that would signal firmness. An immediate deployment of rapid-reaction troops could quickly reinforce critical defenses, whereas a larger response would take longer to assemble but could send a more visible message of NATO solidarity. Additionally, deployments close to the Russian border could risk escalation, but stationing troops at a greater distance could both limit NATO’s ability to react quickly and convey uncertain resolve.
A military response would send a strong message of resolve to Russia and potentially deter further escalation if the Kremlin decides the risk of open conflict with NATO is too great. Moreover, it would position troops to respond quickly and effectively if the situation escalated into open conflict. However, a military response is not a guaranteed deterrent: Moscow could respond by bolstering its own military presence, increasing the risk of a miscalculation or miscommunication that could ignite a large-scale conflict.
Diplomatic initiatives
Interest in solving this crisis peacefully is strong. To pursue a diplomatic resolution, NSC members could consider consultations between the United States and the Baltic states. The United States could also call for a meeting of NATO foreign or defense ministers, or even a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, which was created to address security issues between NATO and Russia but has met only intermittently since the 2014 Crimea crisis. The United States could also take a more direct approach, dispatching a high-level U.S. representative to Moscow—perhaps preceded by a U.S.-Russia presidential phone call. NSC members will need to decide whether diplomatic steps should be tried before military steps are taken or whether pursuing both steps in parallel would be more effective. They will also need to consider whether to seek concessions and what sort of concessions to seek: assurances of security in the Baltics, trust-building measures, or merely beginning talks.
Economic measures
NSC members could also choose to impose economic sanctions on Russia to signal Western opposition to Russia’s actions. Sanctions would reduce the risk of direct military confrontation but could be interpreted by NATO allies as a weak show of support. Moreover, sanctions would not necessarily compel Moscow to act. Sanctions played a large role in Western strategy during the confrontation over the Crimean Peninsula but ultimately have had no effect on Russia’s involvement in that country. Moscow has also used the sanctions as a tool to inflame anti-Western sentiment. However, combined with a fall in oil prices, sanctions significantly weakened Russia’s economy in 2014. Although Russia has largely recovered from that downturn, new and more severe sanctions could have a stronger effect on its actions. As they were during the annexation of Crimea, sanctions can be applied in many forms: against individual leaders, particular companies, or entire sectors of the economy.