What Actually Happened
The United States ultimately decided not to intervene in South Sudan in 2014. Washington announced a series of sanctions on South Sudanese government officials and members of rebel groups deemed responsible for fueling violence in South Sudan. At the same time, the Obama administration sought to maintain an active diplomatic role in pushing for peace. Then U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited South Sudan in May 2014 to push for an end to the conflict. Over the following years U.S. diplomats made repeated attempts to broker a lasting peace deal.
The United States also continued in its efforts to ease the humanitarian crisis unfolding in and around South Sudan as a result of the civil war. From 2014 to 2020, the United States provided over $5 billion in humanitarian aid to South Sudan and neighboring countries hosting large populations of South Sudanese refugees.
These efforts largely failed to have significant influence on the trajectory of the conflict, and South Sudan’s civil war would continue to rage for more than five years after its outbreak. Peace talks continued on and off but fighting often resumed after each round of meetings. In August 2015, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional bloc, successfully mediated a cease-fire agreement. However, the cease-fire was shattered in July 2016 and Kiir- and Machar-aligned forces resumed fighting once more.
The renewed violence that year prevented farmers from planting or harvesting crops, causing severe food shortages in the country. In July 2014, the UN Security Council declared South Sudan’s food crisis the “worst in the world.” In February 2017, the United Nations and some government agencies declared famine in parts of the country, with nearly five million people at risk from food insecurity. Food insecurity has continued and even worsened to this day. In 2023, more than 7.7 million people, or two-thirds of the population, faced severe food insecurity—the worst hunger crisis the country has ever faced.
In June 2018, under increasing international pressure to negotiate, Kiir and Machar met for the first time since 2016 and signed a new IGAD-brokered peace deal. The meeting resulted in a power-sharing agreement in which Machar would return as vice president. The revitalized peace agreement reduced violence in many regions of South Sudan and improved the ability of humanitarian groups to supply aid. South Sudan made economic improvements by resuming its stalled oil production.
The peace process moved slowly. It took nearly two years for the country to successfully form a unity government. Important components of the peace agreement, such as appointments to state governorships, were even slower to be implemented, and remained as potential sources of continued tension. Observers have expressed skepticism about the durability of this agreement and stress that—despite the progress toward peace—South Sudan’s humanitarian crisis has yet to abate.
Few observers advocated that a military intervention in South Sudan should have been undertaken. However, many analysts have argued that the United States could have adopted a more robust response to the crisis. Some experts have particularly criticized the United States’ initial response to the civil war in South Sudan. Many pointed out that in the opening months of the conflict, U.S. policy implicitly supported Kiir’s government. For instance, U.S. policymakers did not support an international arms embargo on the country until 2018, in part over concerns that it would disproportionately affect government forces. Critics argue that these decisions were guided by flawed assumptions about the legitimacy of Kiir’s government, despite evidence that his forces were perpetrating atrocities alongside Machar’s. Instead, these critics assert that the United States should have prioritized stability above all else, including by placing increased diplomatic pressure on South Sudan’s government, and considering advocating the removal of both Kiir and Machar from power.
Ultimately, observers worry that the current peace in South Sudan is not guaranteed to last. Many of the tensions that fueled civil war in South Sudan remain, and instability elsewhere in the region could spread or divert international resources and attention away from South Sudan. Should the current peace break down into renewed civil war in the future, U.S. policymakers could once more face a decision of whether and how to step in.