Boko Haram in Nigeria in 2017 (NSC)

Role of the United States

Policymakers in Washington have usually seen Nigeria as the most important U.S. partner in Africa. Successive U.S. presidents have supported Nigeria’s evolution toward democracy. This support comes not only because of the U.S. belief in democratic governance but also because of Nigeria’s size, diversity, and potential to be a helpful model for other African countries. Democratic failure in Nigeria could be a setback to the development and maintenance of democratic norms that have facilitated cooperation on various issues among many African countries. 

U.S. goals in Nigeria in this case included continued evolution toward democratic governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights. Another U.S. priority was economic development, which would likely promote political stability. In addition, Washington wanted to fight the expansion of militant terrorist movements. The United States has traditionally not had much leverage over the Nigerian government because of Nigeria’s size and oil wealth. Going into 2017, an economic crisis caused by falling oil prices and the threat of Boko Haram could provide Washington with greater negotiating advantage.

The Leahy Amendment forbids the U.S. State and Defense Departments from providing military assistance to foreign militaries if the U.S. secretary of state or defense has credible information that those groups have committed severe human rights violations. Accordingly, three options were possible in responding to Buhari’s request for U.S. authorization to acquire the Super Tucano planes:

Policy Options

NSC members could conclude that U.S. security interests mandate authorizing the sale or transfer of the weapons Buhari requests. 

In this case, National Security Council (NSC) members would need to advise the president on how to either meet or set aside the Leahy Amendment requirements. If the president agreed to Buhari’s request, Washington could press Abuja to set up a commission to investigate credible accusations of abuses by its security forces and take appropriate judicial action. This option would meet the Leahy Amendment’s requirements. It could open the door to a more extensive bilateral military relationship including the sale of more advanced weapons in the future. Addressing human rights abuses by the security services could also diminish Boko Haram’s appeal. But if Abuja declined to take action, it would become more difficult for the United States to provide Nigeria with weaponry. It would also limit Washington’s ability to  build a closer relationship with the country. A public U.S. commitment to provide the requested weaponry could also politically strengthen Buhari’s hand with his critics and boost the Nigerian military’s morale. 

NSC members could conclude that it remains best for the United States to decline Buhari’s request given that the Leahy requirements cannot be met and should not be set aside. 

This option would be the preferred approach if NSC members feared that Nigerian security forces’ using American equipment would lead to significant civilian casualties. Worse, poor management by Nigerian forces could allow the aircraft to fall into the hands of Boko Haram. Further, aircraft require trained pilots. Therefore, any sale of aircraft would likely also require the United States to provide long-term training  assistance for Nigerian pilots. It would take a long time between the authorization of the transfer of the weapons and their use on the battlefield. NSC members could conclude that the risks of both giving the weapons to Nigeria and the possible delay in their actually being used outweigh the benefits of agreeing to Buhari’s request. 

NSC members could advise the president to refuse the sale of aircraft and other requested equipment but offer assistance to the Nigerian security forces and legal system, including courts and prisons. 

Anecdotal evidence has suggested that the Nigerian military faced severe shortfalls in the low-tech military equipment necessary for fighting an asymmetric war. The Nigerian military needed more ammunition, rifles, transport, tents, and medical equipment. The United States could provide these items without triggering the requirements of the Leahy Amendment. This option could include training and low-tech military equipment. However, it would not include heavier equipment such as aircraft. This type of assistance would likely actually prove more successful than heavy weapons against Boko Haram. It would also be unlikely to provide the immediate political boost Buhari sought. However, if such assistance helped Nigeria make its military, police force, and courts more professional and efficient, this option could conceivably reduce human rights abuses and pave the way for the United States to approve future requests for heavier military equipment.