Simulation from Conflict & Warfare
Drones in Pakistan in 2011 (NSC)

Educator Overview

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Case Overview

Set in Spring, 2011. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a vigorous campaign against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The U.S. intelligence community believes they have identified the location of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden. The United States must decide whether to try to kill or capture bin Laden—and if so, how. Each policy option—including a drone strike, a raid by special operations forces, a request that Pakistan act, and inaction—has costs and benefits for U.S. security and the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Drones, in particular, have become a core element of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, but their use is controversial. 

Decision Point

After a decade-long search, the CIA has come upon credible evidence of the location of Osama bin Laden. A man whom they believe to be the al-Qaeda leader is living inside a large compound in Abbottabad, a populous city near Pakistan’s capital of Islamabad. The compound also houses roughly twenty women and children, believed to be bin Laden’s relatives. However, based on surveillance of the compound, no one can say with absolute certainty that the individual they have identified is indeed bin Laden. Most of the CIA analysts involved have put their confidence level at 80 percent; some report 95 percent confidence, others rate their confidence as low as 40 percent. 

The president has convened a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) to receive advice on how to proceed. If the president decides to authorize action, three main options exist. The first is to conduct a drone strike against the compound, likely killing those in it. This option would risk civilian casualties and potential damage to an already tumultuous relationship with Pakistan. The second option is a raid by special operations forces. A raid could be effective in that troops could correctly identify individual targets and take caution to protect civilians. Troops could also collect computers and documents for intelligence. However, this option poses greater risk to the lives of U.S. service members and could also damage the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Third, the president could ask the Pakistani military to capture or kill bin Laden. This would respect diplomatic ties but has a lower chance of success. Given the lack of complete certainty, the president could also decide to wait for additional confirmation or a better opportunity to strike. However, waiting risks losing the chance to act entirely if the occupants of the compound move and the CIA loses track of them. The president needs to decide quickly whether to authorize action to kill or capture the man believed to be bin Laden and, if so, what action to take.

Learning Goals

CFR Education simulations use a variety of pedagogical tools to create an effective, meaningful, and memorable learning experience for students that builds their global literacy. Students will develop crucial skills such as critical thinking, communication, collaboration, and creativity. Students will complete authentic assessments that feel relevant: instead of five-paragraph essays and book reports, students will write policy memos and participate in a role-play of a meeting of a foreign policy–making body. There are no right or wrong answers in actual policy deliberations, and there are none here, either; students will walk away from this experience with an appreciation for the complexity of policy questions.

In this simulation, students will learn about the National Security Council, as well as meeting these learning outcomes specific to this simulation:

  • Students will understand the evolution of drone usage as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism operations.
  • Students will consider the concerns raised with the usage of drones to conduct targeted killings and precision strikes against members of terrorist organizations including circumstances that may violate a national sovereignty.
  • Students will evaluate the options available to the United States to capture or kill a high profile leader of al-Qaeda.

Concepts and Issues

Concepts

Issues

  • Costs and benefits of U.S. counterterrorism tools
  • Debates surrounding the U.S. use of drones
  • Trust and mistrust between the United States and its counterterrorism partners
  • Threat posed by al-Qaeda

Policy Options: Educator's Guide

This section presents context, potential benefits and drawbacks, and other information about the policy options outlined in the case that you could find helpful as you guide the role-play and assess students. 

The U.S. involvement in this case stems from not only September 11 but also a long history of al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. service members, civilians, and interests. Especially since 9/11, U.S. military forces, diplomats, and intelligence personnel have operated both unilaterally and in conjunction with local security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. A primary tactic has been killing certain al-Qaeda leaders and a vastly greater number of anonymous militants through drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations. 

The principal options available in this case are as follows:

Conducting drone strikes on the compound believed to be inhabited by bin Laden

A drone strike offers a relatively low-risk option that could provide a strong chance of eliminating bin Laden if he is present at the compound. It would not put U.S. personnel in harm’s way. Drones can also be incredibly precise, capable of killing targeted individuals while leaving those nearby unharmed. Despite this precision, drones do still pose the risk of killing or injuring any civilians in the immediate area of the strike.  The precision of strikes only matters if the intelligence is timely and accurate. Additionally, after a drone strike, it could be impossible to confirm the identity of the target. Given the range of confidence levels in the available intelligence and the extremely high priority of bin Laden as a target, this option could therefore leave an intolerable amount of uncertainty over whether the strike indeed killed bin Laden. Finally, given the public opposition to drones in Pakistan, this option would risk further damaging already delicate relations with Pakistan. 

Ordering a U.S. special forces raid on the compound

A special forces raid offers certain advantages over drone strikes. Primarily, U.S. forces can confirm the identity of those in the compound to ensure that bin Laden was present. Moreover, special forces teams could capture individuals to interrogate and collect information and equipment that could provide intelligence about al-Qaeda. Additionally, personnel can take greater care to protect civilians. However, a raid would expose the individuals involved—and the United States’ reputation—to extreme risks. U.S. forces could be killed in a battle at the compound or by the Pakistani military should it become aware of the mission and try to disrupt it. Al-Qaeda could also capture members of the raiding party, giving the terrorist organization hostages of incalculable value and immediately presenting the United States with the agonizing choice of how to respond. All of this raises the risk of deeper U.S. involvement. Additionally, Pakistan would likely perceive a high-profile American raid—especially one so close to its capital—as an intolerable violation of its sovereignty. The operation could lead to a rupture that would end what little cooperation remained between the two countries. If the United States gave Pakistan prior warning of the mission to avoid such a rupture, elements of Pakistan’s government could pass on the information to al-Qaeda leaders allowing bin Laden and others to flee. 

Asking the Pakistani government to capture or kill bin Laden

This option would spare American lives and eliminate the chance of an irreparable diplomatic breach. However, it also offers a far more uncertain chance of success. The Pakistani government could refuse to pursue bin Laden or it could agree but tip off bin Laden or execute the mission incompetently. Despite occasional successes, the United States has had a long history of frustration with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This frustration has contributed to bilateral tensions and the belief among many American policymakers that the United States needs to pursue major terrorist targets itself. Especially for such a high-value target, the risks of entrusting this operation to another country would be significant.

Doing nothing

Given the drawbacks of the other available options and the lack of complete certainty from the intelligence community, the president could choose to delay action and continue to monitor the compound. Such a step has the downside of diminishing the utility of timely intelligence and allowing bin Laden to continue operating unhindered, possibly leading to further attacks on the United States or its allies. Moreover, similar issues to those considered here are likely to arise the next time intelligence on his location emerges. Given the particular circumstances of this case—including the possible presence of civilians at the targeted site—the president could decide to pass on this opportunity. There is a chance that the target’s whereabouts and U.S.-Pakistan relations will be more favorable in the future. At times in the past, the United States has carefully considered the consequences of a counterterrorism operation for its relationship with Pakistan. In 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aborted a large-scale raid on senior al-Qaeda members located in Pakistan’s tribal areas because it had the potential to jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations and place many American lives at risk.