Opposing Communism in 1947

After World War II, the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union quickly dissolved into mutual mistrust. As the victorious Allies sought to shape the postwar world, the Soviet Union set out to establish a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. After the war, Moscow installed pro-Soviet governments and supported communist movements in several European countries. Soviet expansion was initially consistent with wartime agreements among the Allies. However, growing communist movements in Europe and the Middle East raised suspicions among policymakers in the United States and the United Kingdom. The West suspected that Soviet ambitions extended beyond a regional sphere of influence. 

By 1947, communist governments ruled nearly all of Eastern Europe. Greece, which had been liberated from German occupation with British assistance, was the exception. Even there, however, communist forces rebelling against the monarchist government threatened to knock Greece into the Soviet Union’s orbit. Seeking to maintain influence in Greece and prevent the spread of communism, the United Kingdom supported the Greek government. The British government spent roughly $300 million on financial aid, arms, and military training—a substantial sum at the time. Greek communists, on the other hand, received support from neighboring communist countries. British and American policymakers suspected that the Soviet Union also covertly supported the Greek communists. Western observers feared that if the Greek communists prevailed, their triumph could trigger a domino effect. This outcome could lead to expanding Soviet influence into neighboring Turkey—which controlled a strategic choke point between the Mediterranean and Black seas. Beyond Turkey, the West feared that communism could then spread rapidly through the Middle East. Some analysts further speculated that Soviet expansion could propel Europe back toward war.

So far, the United States had pursued piecemeal responses to Soviet expansion and was providing limited loans and arms sales to the Greek government. In the Harry S. Truman administration, however, many thought that the situation required a more systematic strategy. The Soviet Union wanted to expand communism, they argued, not only to enlarge its regional influence but to weaken Western powers and destroy democratic ideals worldwide. Accordingly, Soviet expansion directly threatened U.S. values and national security. But administration officials also asserted that the Soviet Union was cautious and would withdraw when it met resistance. Every effort to expand communism, therefore, required a response. However, some policymakers opposed such a universal approach. They argued that committing to counter communism at every turn could sacrifice the United States’ ability to choose its battles. For example, such a universal approach to fighting communism could potentially obligate the country to act against its interests or commit resources in disadvantageous situations. After a long and destructive war, many U.S. lawmakers were also wary of further entanglements in European affairs. These policymakers questioned why the United States should be responsible for countering Soviet activity in Europe. With much of Western Europe engulfed in a postwar economic crisis, though, European powers alone lacked the strength to counter Soviet influence in Europe for long. As Soviet expansion continued, U.S. policymakers would soon have to decide how to respond.